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Abstract 
In most liberalised electricity retail markets, incumbent firms still hold the majority of residential 
consumers. This situation focused the attention of regulatory institutions and energy economists on the 
determinants of consumers switching decisions. Fewer studies have, however, been devoted to measuring 
switching costs. In the present paper we calculate these costs in the Great Britain electricity retail market 
by revisiting the model suggested in Shy, O. (2002), A quick-and-easy method for estimating switching 
costs, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, pp. 71–87. The average net cost of switching regional 
incumbents is €385 while the net cost of switching back to them is negative for customers on standard 
credit or direct debit plans but positive for prepayment customers.   
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1 Introduction 
 
In several countries where electricity markets were liberalised many customers remain attached to 
incumbent retailers. In Great Britain, competition in electricity intensified quickly with a 
significant number of entrants offering attractive discounts and services, but still regional 
incumbents hold a considerable share of consumers in their former monopoly area (more than 
60% customers in certain regions). In March 2006 those incumbents, also known as ex-public 
electricity suppliers (PES), held together with British Gas (BG, thereafter), 99% of domestic 
electricity customers (BG’ own figure is 24%), a situation which has remained unchanged since 
December 2003 (see Ofgem, 2006). 
 
This inertia focused economists’ interest in measuring switching costs and identifying their 
determinants. Most studies suggest substantial costs of switching to alternative retailers, and more 
particularly to new entrants both in the residential electricity and gas markets. The literature in 
this area has however paid more attention to the determinants of switching and search decisions 
than to measuring switching costs per se. Taking a discrete choice model applied to 986 
households in Sweden, Sturluson (2002) estimates switching and search costs. The estimate for 
the former is about €362. In the United States Goett et al. (2000) suggests unfamiliar energy 
retailers would obtain the same market share as the local utility if it offered a savings of about €75 
annually for a typical 3300 kWh household and all of its other attributes where the same. 
 
Other approaches that calculate switching costs rely on calibrated theoretical models of 
competition between firms. In the Great Britain electricity retail market Green (2000) calculates 
the profit-maximising price which an unregulated incumbent would set given utility-maximizing 
customers have a cost to switch the incumbent. The author computes the switching cost (it is 
endogenous) that solves its model for a given set of calibrating parameters. Assuming they do not 
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exceed two times the incumbent’s price and a demand elasticity between – 0.5 and – 0.1, the 
author predicts levels of incumbents’ market share that range from roughly 45% to 55%. These 
shares and the endogenous number of entrants, six to seven, is indeed very close to what we 
currently observe in several regions of Great Britain. The incumbent’s price is however 75% 
above that of the entrants, which overestimates actual price differential that does not exceed 
25%.1 In an extension to the previous paper Green (2005) allows for dual fuel offers to compete 
with those for electricity only. Its analytical solution gives price differentials between electricity 
incumbents and BG, as a function of the differences in costs between them and the average 
switching cost.  In most regions, the cost of switching from an electricity incumbent to a new 
entrant is about €540. 
 
In the gas retail market, Giulietti et al. (2005) extends a pioneer study from Bennett and Waddams 
Price (1999) in England that identifies the determinants of switching decisions. Their approach is 
similar to that of Sturluson (2002). By relating the frequency of switchers to savings on monthly 
bills they find that with an annual price of €150 above that of its competitors, BG would keep 
55% of its customers. A shortcoming of these approaches is that the switching decision does not 
relate to consumers’ perception of switching gain (net of the gross cost of switching) but to gains 
calculated from actual price differential. Potential savings may not be reflective of switching 
costs, however. As we will show in the theoretical model of the following section, potential 
savings merely reflect a bound on switching costs. 
 
Less sophisticated approaches report potential gains as measures of switching gains available to 
consumers.  Waterson (2003) obtains potential gains simply by subtracting the price of each 
entrant from the incumbents’ in their former monopoly area. Order statistics of market prices are 
                                                 
1 This percentage is for the direct debit market in 2003. 
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employed in several Ofgem’s2 reports on electricity retail competition and in Giulietti et al. (2004). 
The latter authors assumes that a fall in both switching and search costs from incumbents to 
entrants result in prices that should move closer over time. Salies (2006) estimates the differential 
effects on retail charges of large and small retailers in the different distribution regions in Great 
Britain controlling among other factors for network size and regional customers density. As 
expected, independent entrant retailers have the lowest impact on charges with predicted annual 
savings of up to £50, as between the cheapest and the most expensive supplier. This difference 
was highest in the direct debit market while the effect of Innogy and Powergen groups on 
charges is greater or equal to the average effect. This seems consistent with large retailers 
charging higher prices as a result of the existence of higher costs of switching for these firms’ 
customers. It is worth emphasising again that approaches that rely on potential gains are subject 
to the critic that price differential may be uninformative about equilibrium switching costs. A 
firm may charge the same price than that of a rival of similar size but the cost of switching 
between them may take any positive value. This is a result of most theoretical models of price 
competition when consumers have switching costs (Klemperer, 1995, p. 520). 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to measure consumers’ switching costs in the Great Britain 
electricity retail market by following and refining the model of price competition suggested in Shy 
(2002). That model borrows from a solution concept previously developed in Morgan and Shy 
(2000), the Undercut proof equilibrium (hereafter UPE). In the duopoly case, each firm sets its 
price subject to the constraint that the other firm will not find it profitable to undercut that price 
and grab all customers. These prices satisfy a weaker concept introduced in Shy (2002, p. 75), the 
Undercut proof property (hereafter UPP). At equilibrium, UPP prices are function of firms’ 
market shares and unobservable switching costs. Using observations only on prices and market 
shares, these variables can be mapped into two levels of switching costs (one for each brand). To 
                                                 
2 Ofgem is the abbreviation for Office for Gas and Electricity Markets, the energy market regulator in Great Britain. 
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our knowledge, that methodology has been applied for measuring customers switching costs in 
the banking and telecom retail markets (Shy, 2002) and in broadband Internet between service 
providers (Krafft and Salies, 2006). 
 
The plan is as follows. In section 2 we revisit the UPP in the two-firm case by giving more 
precise conditions of the parameter space (market shares and prices) under which switching costs 
can be measured. Unlike Morgan and Shy (2000), and Shy (2002) we assume consumers have 
switching costs in the theoretical model. One implication is that the theoretical prediction made 
by these authors that larger firm charge lower price becomes a particular case. Furthermore, our 
model takes account of the possibility to find negative switching costs. To permit the 
introduction of negative switching costs in the Shy’s model we allow for an added-value (see 
Green, 2000) attached to target firms, which leads to the concept of net switching costs not well 
identified in the previous literature. Section 3 overviews the main components of switching costs 
in retail electricity markets. We then measure those costs in the 14 regions of Great Britain 
between the electricity incumbent and the most significant new entrant in terms of market share 
at the time of the study, Atlantic electric and Gas. Empirical results are discussed in this section. 
Further discussion and conclusion are reported in Section 4.   
 
2 The underlying model 
 
Two firms a and b sell a homogenous product to N consumers.  There are 0>αN  brand a-
oriented consumers (type α) and 0>βN  brand b-oriented consumers (type β), with βα NNN +≡ .  
Type α consumers perceive a cost sab of switching to firm b while type β consumers perceive a 
cost sba of switching to a.  The utility functions of each type of consumer are:  
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where Ui denotes gross utility of consumer type i=α, β.  Ta is firm a’s price and Tb is firm b’s 
price.  Let nα  and nβ  denote the number of customers buying brand a and b, respectively.  This 
numbers depend on prices and switching behaviours of both types of customers:   
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The following definition extends Shy (2002, p. 75)’s definition of UPP prices.   
 
Proposition 1. 
2
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UPP if { }1 1max 1 ,1 2ab ba bas s sδ δ≥ − − −+ + , where δ denotes (Nα–Nβ)/Nβ.   
Proof: see Appendix.  
Under equal switching costs Shy (2002)’s model predicts that the larger firm charges the lower 
price.  The next proposition shows that this is not generally true. This holds only under some 
conditions relating markets shares to switching costs. 
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Proposition 2. Assume the larger firm is a (Nα>Nβ).  
(a) If sba>0 and –sba/(2+δ)<sab<(1+δ)sba then a charges the lower price. 
(b) If sba>0 and sab>(1+δ)sba then a charges the higher price. 
(c) If sba<0 and { }1 1max 1 ,1 2ab ba bas s sδ δ≥ − − −+ +  then a charges the higher price. 
Assume the larger firm is b (Nα<Nβ). 
(d) If sba>0 and sab<(1+δ)sba then a charges the higher price. 
Proof: It follows from (6), (7) and (8) in the Appendix and the additional assumption Ta–Tb>0 
for cases (b)-(d) and Ta–Tb<0 in case (a). 
3  
 
In all cases where prices satisfy the UPP, switching costs are NTNTs UbUaab /β−=  and 
NTNTs UaUbba /α−= .  
 
Propositions 1 and 2 show that more rigorous conditions relating the values of switching costs to 
market shares are necessary for UPP prices to be valid predictions of these costs given actual data 
on prices and market shares. Our refinement of Shy (2002)’s model reinforces the interest in 
applying it as theoretical frame to understand firms’ pricing behaviour in markets where 
consumers have switching costs. Our model captures situations such as the larger firm does not 
necessarily charges a lower price and the smaller firm may serve customers with the higher 
switching cost. But as will be shown in the application of the following section, the model is 
likely to fail in the particular case where actual prices are identical.  
 
3 Calculation of switching costs in the Great Britain electricity retail market 
 
                                                 
3 The proof is available from the author. 
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Switching costs can limit competition in a mature market like electricity (Green, 2002, p. 2). In 
residential electricity markets these costs are transaction costs in closing an account with one’s 
current electricity retailer and opening another with a competitor. At the time of our study 
customers were required to give their old retailer 28 days’ notice, pay any outstanding bills owing 
to them and take a meter reading on the day they change retailer (DTI, 2000, pp. 17–19; Padilla et 
al., 2003, Annexe C, pp. 11–12).  Consumers must also find which retailers operate in their local 
area, and which offer the best packages for their needs. Although the main determinant of 
switching is expected savings (DTI, 2001, p. 17) none customer will switch its retailer if 
alternative offers are indistinguishable with respect to price but also quality. This is very likely to 
happen in homogenous product industries such as electricity.  Cognitive costs seem important 
too and are essentially a result of brand reputation and one’s experience with its current supplier. 
4 Thus if one is initially indifferent between services supplied by two competing retailers, the fact 
of using one brand will change consumers’ relative utilities for the products so that they perceive 
a cost of switching brands. This is a result of people’s desire to reduce cognitive dissonance (see 
Klemperer, 1995, p. 518). 5 
 
Many customers’ costs of switching to a new retailer have parallels in firm’s costs of serving new 
customers. Retailers approached up to 15 millions customers (about 60% of households in GB) 
this way (Padilla et al., 2003, p. 25). It costs about €55 (at €1.5 for £1) to acquire a domestic 
customer using doorstep, selling, advertising and mail shots (Ofgem, 1999, p. 52; Ofgem, 2004, 
Annexe 11, pp. 86–91). NAO (2001, p. 39) reports higher costs of acquiring new customers using 
                                                 
4 Reputation plays a major role in the Great Britain gas retail market (Giulietti et al., 2005). In utilities markets, most 
consumers are supplied by default firms, which thus gives these latter serious advantages over unknown new 
entrants. 
5 Following Klemperer’s argument, most electricity customers would like their current retailer’s service because they 
are used to it, and learned to like the benefits it provides (cooking, lighting, heating, watching TV). 
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direct marketing techniques. They range from €45 to €75. Acquisition costs seem to be a good 
upper bound proxy for search costs, the average values of which is about €27 as found in 
Sturluson (2002) for Swedish customers. 
 
We consider the annual bill charged to a typical 3300 kWh customer in December 2003. These 
data are obtained from the 2004’ April report of Ofgem. We choose these data as they include 
details on the national market share of electricity retailers by payment method and allow 
comparison with the results found in Green (2005) who follows a different methodology. New 
entrants supplied 190 000 electricity customers nationally (less than 1% however of the national 
customers, however). In September 2002, the sum of ex-PES’ market shares equals 64% in Great 
Britain, with a minimum at 57% and a maximum at 83%.  Table 1 shows December 2003 data on 
Ex-PES’ market shares.   
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
We consider Altantic Electric and Gas as the new entrant competing with each regional 
incumbent. Atlantic was the largest new entrant company supplying about 300,000 gas and 
electricity customers in April 2004, the month at which it was acquired by Scottish Hydro 
Electric-Southern Electric. We compute switching costs for three payment methods (standard 
credit, direct debit and prepayment). In December 2003, Atlantic Electric and Gas had less than 
1% of domestic customers who spread as 53% direct debit customers, 39% standard credit 
customers, and the remaining share pay with prepayment schemes (see Ofgem, 2004, p. 159).  
 
We do not know the particulars shares of electricity customers supplied by this entrant in each 
region. Given the above figures, we arbitrarily set its share to 1% in every region and to 0.53%, 
0.39% and 0.07% for the different types of customers, respectively. Ex-PES’ shares of customers 
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in their former monopoly areas are also given in Table 1.  The fraction for each customer type is 
known at the national level (see last column). We apply those percentages in each region for 
calculating switching costs. Table 2 shows the results. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
It is worth noting here that we measure switching costs of customers who are not switching. As 
expected the cost of switching from large incumbents to Atlantic is well higher than the cost of 
switching back to them. These results are those predicted by (c) in Proposition 2. In the non-
prepayment markets, customers with high switching costs buy the more expensive brand while 
customers with low switching costs buy the less expensive brand. Interestingly, these costs vary 
across payment methods. In the prepayment market, the entrant seems to lock its customers in as 
the costs of switching back are positive. These costs are however small relative to that of 
incumbents’ customers. This lock-in by the entrant can be explained after looking at price 
differentials that are close to zero as shown in the last column of Table 2. Incumbents’ prices are 
largest in this market but also too close to those of the entrant to be attractive. The entrant even 
charges a price equal or greater than that of five regional incumbents. Thus once customers have 
switched their incumbent they have only little incentive to switch back. Cases (a) and (d) in 
Proposition 2 predict this situation apart from that where prices are equal. 6 
 
The negative costs of switching for entrant’s customers in the non-prepayment markets suggest 
that incumbents are likely to win them back. This however enters in contradiction with the 
observation that the entrant charges lower prices in these markets. Negative values can be 
                                                 
6 Our model does not provide valid prediction of switching costs in this situation as the condition that relates market 
shares to switching costs is precisely sab/sba=(1+δ)=Nα/Nβ. In the three regions where prices are identical (see Table 
2), we obtain sab/sba=11.7, 11.2, 9.8 while (1+δ) is about the 100 value. 
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supported by borrowing from Green (2000)’s model of customers’ choice between an entrant 
and an incumbent in the electricity retail market where the author assumes consumers perceive 
net switching costs. To be more precise assume the incumbent is firm a. Following Green’s 
notation, the cost of switching back to an incumbent, sba is a difference between a gross cost of 
switching sb (e.g. search and transaction) and an added-value vab that is the positive extra utility 
that b’s customers attach to a. 7 That could represent elements such as reputation and quality of 
service.  
 
4 Conclusion and discussion 
 
Our results support those found by other authors that switching costs are likely to reach high 
values. The cost of switching regional incumbents is consistent for example with that obtained 
for Swedish customers. We found the following interesting result in the prepayment market that 
it is possible for new entrants to retain customers. This suggests that the entrant’s customers 
would perceive a gross cost of switching too high relative to the value they attach to the 
incumbent. That value may be low given that both the incumbents and the entrant charge close 
and high prices relative to those offered to non-prepayment customers. In the latter, the costs to 
switch the entrant are negative thus supporting that many customers may be inclined to switch 
back to their default provider or to other reputed and well established incumbents. We measured 
those costs by using an extension of Shy (2002)’s model that, we hope will reinforce its appeal to 
policy analysts. Under more rigorous conditions on the values of switching costs and market 
shares, this extension allowed us for example to predict a new equilibrium where the larger firm 
charges a higher price.  
 
                                                 
7 The gross cost of switching does not depends upon to whom b’s consumers switch to. 
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Table 1  Market Shares in Dec 2003 
BG 
   (3) 
   24 
    43,38,17 (a) 
 (1)  (2) 
Innogy     
Npower 
(Midland) 53  
15 
Yorkshire 52  
Northern 52  
    34,48,13 
SSE     
Southern 68 
 14 North Scot. 82 
Swalec 67 
    41,40,15 
EDF Energy 
(LE)   
  
London 65 
 14 Sweb 63 
Seeboard 61 
    31,50,15 
SPower     
South Scot. 63 
 11 
Merseyside,   
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North Wales 55 
    40,38,18 
Powergen     
East Midl. 56  21 
    40,43,14 
TXU Energi     
Eastern 59  
 
Norweb 49  
Others    1 
    53,39,7 
Total    100 
(1) = Ex-PES' share of electricity customers supplied in their former monopoly area. 
(2) = Principal electricity retailers groups shares of national domestic electricity supply by 
customers supplied. ‘Others’ is Atlantic Electric & Gas.  
(3) = BG's share of domestic electricity customers. 
     (a) : Share by main payment methods (direct debit, standard credit and prepayment).   
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Table 2 Switching costs between regional 
incumbents (Ex-PESs) and Atlantic Electric & Gas 
 
 
   
 Switching cost (€)      
   from the Ex-PES to Atlantic from Atlantic to the Ex-PES Price difference 
 Ex-PES' In-Area Ex-PES' Direct Standard   Direct Standard   Direct Standard   
Area Retail business Market Share Debit Credit Prepayment Debit Credit Prepayment Debit Credit Prepayment 
Eastern Powergen 0.59 356.64 365.71 336.02 -65.53 -47.83 28.48 73.50 54.00 0.00 
East Midlands Powergen 0.56 356.17 372.86 336.00 -59.11 -48.87 30.00 67.50 55.50 0.00 
London EDF Energy 0.65 355.08 371.00 356.68 -44.70 -31.82 28.62 54.00 37.50 -3,00 
Manweb Manweb 0.55 391.10 412.54 405.50 -53.61 -43.53 21.75 63.00 51.00 15.00 
Midlands Npower 0.53 354.30 374.47 367.67 -48.13 -39.47 22.21 58.50 46.50 15.00 
Northern Npower 0.52 369.01 389.28 392.08 -58.00 -48.06 19.40 69.00 55.50 21.00 
Norweb Powergen 0.49 367.02 381.00 351.17 -62.13 -49.26 35.83 72.00 57.00 0.00 
Scottish Hydro Scottish Hydro E. 0.82 398.38 420.27 402.13 -67.24 -59.39 13.86 73.50 64.50 9.00 
Scottish Power Scottish Power 0.63 408.46 431.18 425.07 -64.94 -54.68 17.14 73.50 61.50 16.50 
Seeboard EDF Energy 0.61 345.90 361.91 347.38 -47.35 -36.10 20.54 57.00 42.00 6.00 
Southern Southern E. 0.68 378.10 400.10 401.11 -60.34 -52.63 10.95 67.50 58.50 16.50 
Swalec Swalec 0.67 413.27 436.93 437.20 -56.55 -47.49 13.88 64.50 54.00 16.50 
Sweb EDF Energy 0.63 387.12 405.01 386.64 -49.54 -35.60 31.66 60.00 42.00 -3.00 
Yorkshire Npower 0.52 349.72 369.92 378.06 -46.57 -37.92 22.49 57.00 45.00 16.50 
Sources: Ofgem (2004) and energywatch’s website (http://energywatch.com). 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1:  for given bT  and nβ , firm a chooses the highest price aT  subject to  
( )b b a abn T N T sβpi = ≥ −     (3) 
Simultaneously, for given aT  and nα , firm b chooses the highest price bT  subject to  
( )a a b ban T N T sαpi = ≥ −     (4) 
Let’s find the UPP prices and associated market shares.  It can be shown that (3)-(4) holds with 
equality.  This system has a solution in prices if 02 >− βαnnN .  We obtain,  
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βα
β
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−
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22
)(
 ,
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   (5) 
As consumers spread across firms, there are three possible cases for ( )UU nn βα , . (i): ( )0,N ; (ii): 
( ), 0N ; (iii): ( ),N Nα β .  Subtract b’s price from a’s (
βα
αβ
nnN
snsnN
TT
baab
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−
−
=−
2
)(
).  Cases (i) and (ii) 
are not equilibriums.  From (2a), (2b), a b abT T s− >  is associated with ( ),n nα β = ( )0,N  whereas 
price differential at equilibrium from (5) is a b abT T s− = .  Similarly, a b baT T s− < −  is associated 
with ( ),n nα β = ( ), 0N  whereas price differential is baUbUa sTT −=− .  In case (iii), price differential is 
βα
αβ
NNN
sNsNN
TT
baab
U
b
U
a
−
−
=−
2
)(
.  The relative values of sba and sab determine several equilibrium.  
Denote δ  as ββα NNN /)( − .   
Under case (iii), prices satisfy the UPP if ba a b abs T T s− ≤ − ≤ , i.e. 
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ab
baab
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                          (6) 
This double inequality imposes some restrictions on the relative values of markets shares and 
switching costs.  Replace absNβ  with 
1 2( )ab abN s N N N N sβ α β
−± −  then price differential is: 
   
βα
αα
NNN
NssNN
s
baab
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−
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         (7) 
Similarly, if we replace basNα  with 
1 2( )ba baN s N N N N sα α β
−± −  we obtain 
  
βα
ββ
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NssNN
s
abba
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−
+
+−
2
)(
         (8) 
If switching costs are positive, (6) is easy to verify.  Switching costs can however be negative, 
which requires the constraints that the second terms in both (7) and (8) be simultaneously greater 
or equal to zero.  This leads us to the relationship between market shares and switching costs 
stated in Proposition 1.  We finally mention two particular cases which are easy to demonstrate: 
baab ss )1( δ+=  and 0≡δ  (firms share the market equally).  In the first case, firms charge the same 
price.  In the second case, 
2
( )
3a b ab ba
T T s s− = − . 
■ 
